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VER the Survey period, Texas state and federal courts have
shown an increasing tendency to intervene in the employer-em-
ployee relationship by imposing affirmative duties on both the
employer and the employee with respect to handling conflicts that arise in
the workplace. Sexual harassment and disability discrimination claims,
often combined with common law tort claims arising out of the same con-
duct, continued to make up a large part of the courts' employment-re-
lated docket. This article is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of all
case law involving employment or labor law issues, but rather an update




The Texas Supreme Court, in a case of first impression and potentially
sweeping impact, recently decided in NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Rennels'
that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act 2 ("TCHRA") allows
individuals who do not have a direct employment relationship with the
defendant to bring suit under the Act. The plaintiff in this case was a
pathologist who, although directly employed by a physician group, per-
formed her work duties at the defendant hospital, the group's primary
client. The pathology group terminated the plaintiff, who then alleged
sex discrimination and was reinstated. The plaintiff was notified a few
months later that she would be made a shareholder once the necessary
paperwork was completed. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff overheard a
conversation between the hospital's CEO and a shareholder of the pa-
thology group, wherein the CEO said he did not want the plaintiff to
become a shareholder in the pathology group. A month later, the plain-
tiff was informed that she would not be made a shareholder, and was then
terminated by the pathology group after her refusal to sign a release of
any sex discrimination claims against the group and the hospital.
The plaintiff sued the hospital for retaliatory discharge under section
21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. She alleged that members of the hospi-
tal's board sought to block her promotion within the physician group and
in effect discharged her based on unlawful retaliation for the plaintiff's
complaints of sex discrimination. The hospital argued that the plaintiff
lacked standing under the TCHRA, as it was not plaintiff's employer.
The court ruled that to maintain standing under the Act, a plaintiff
must show:
1) that the defendant is an employer within the statutory definition
of the Act; 2) that some sort of employment relationship exists be-
1. 994 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1999).
2. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon 1996).
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tween the plaintiff and a third party; and 3) that the defendant con-
trolled access to the plaintiff's employment opportunities and denied
or interfered with that access based on unlawful criteria. 3
Because it was essentially undisputed that the hospital was an employer
under the Act-although not the plaintiffs employer-and that the plain-
tiff maintained a direct employment relationship with the physician
group, the third element was the critical factor in this case.
The court reasoned that this element was satisfied, because the hospital
and the physician group had entered into agreements giving the hospital
control over certain employment issues. In one agreement, the hospital
described the group's duties and dictated how the department was to be
set up, retained approval authority over the director of the department,
retained the right to reject substitute pathologists, controlled the prepara-
tion of reports generated by the group, and prohibited the group and its
pathologists from contracting to perform services for any other hospital
without prior consent. The group also entered into a second agreement
with the hospital, under which the hospital detailed the pathology depart-
ment director's duties. Reviewing these facts, the court determined that
the hospital could and did control access to the plaintiff's employment
opportunities through those agreements.4 Therefore, the court reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the hospital, which had
been based on the plaintiff's lack of standing.5
1. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
The law on sexual harassment continued to evolve in the wake of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton6 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.7 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant interpretation of Faragher and Ellerth during the Survey period is
contained in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc.8 In Indest, the plaintiff-employee alleged an incident of sexual har-
assment by a vice president of the company while working at a trade
show out of town. She followed the company's sexual harassment policy
and reported the incident immediately, and the employer promptly inves-
tigated. The employer then disciplined the accused manager by issuing a
verbal and written reprimand, imposing a suspension without pay, and
prohibiting him from attending an annual sales meeting he had histori-
cally conducted.
Applying the rule of Faragher and Ellerth, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's
Title VII sexual harassment claims.9 The court noted that the harassment
3. NME Hospitals, 994 S.W.2d at 147 (citations omitted).
4. See id. at 147-48.
5. See id.
6. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
7. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
8. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
9. See id. at 267.
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occurred four times over a six-day period and was neither severe nor per-
vasive enough to establish an actionable hostile work environment.
Moreover, because the employer took swift and appropriate remedial ac-
tion by promptly investigating and taking disciplinary action against the
harasser after the plaintiff complained, the employer's response actually
prevented the creation of a hostile work environment.' 0
Significantly, the court allowed the employer to utilize the Faragheri
Ellerth affirmative defense afforded in cases of supervisory liability where
no tangible employment action results from the hostile environment de-
spite the fact that, technically, one prong of the defense was not satisfied.
That is, although the employer could show that it took action designed to
prevent and promptly correct the hostile work environment, the em-
ployer could not show that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to promptly
report the harassment or that she otherwise failed to avoid harm. The
court opined that holding an employer strictly liable under Faragher and
Ellerth, even where the employer "nipped a hostile [work] environment
in the bud," would undermine the deterrent policies underlying Title
VII.Il
The Fifth Circuit again took up the issue of how to apply the affirma-
tive defense established in Faragher and Ellerth when it withdrew and
replaced an earlier panel decision in Watts v. Kroger Co., 12 in which a
plaintiff alleged that she was sexually harassed by a supervisor who made
crude jokes and sexual innuendoes and grabbed her. When the plaintiff
first complained, she merely told her store manager that the supervisor
had made remarks about her private life. The manager told the supervi-
sor to stop, but shortly afterward, the plaintiff's work schedule and work
assignments were changed to her detriment. The plaintiff then filed a
union grievance alleging sexual harassment. The employer determined,
through the grievance process, that the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim
was not substantiated, but it issued a verbal reprimand to the supervisor
and offered the plaintiff a transfer.
The court held that neither the schedule change nor the assignment of
additional work constituted a tangible employment action sufficient to
trigger liability under the quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment. 13
Accordingly, the case was treated as a hostile environment situation,
whereby the employer was entitled to assert the affirmative defense set
forth in Faragher and Ellerth. The court decided that the employer was
not entitled to summary judgment based on the affirmative defense, be-
cause the plaintiff's three-month delay in filing a grievance was not per se
unreasonable.1 4 Moreover, the court determined that it was not unrea-
sonable as a matter of law for the plaintiff to file a union grievance in-
10. See id. at 265-66.
11. Id. at 266.
12. 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999), superseding 147 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 1998).
13. See id. at 510.
14. See id.
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stead of following the employer's sexual harassment policies. 15
Conversely, in Scrivner v. Socorro Independent School District,16 the
Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the employer school district in a case in
which the plaintiff, a teacher, alleged that she was subjected to harass-
ment by the school principal from the beginning of her employment, but
initially chose not to complain. In fact, when the district began an investi-
gation of the principal in response to an anonymous letter accusing the
principal of sexual harassment, the plaintiff denied that she had witnessed
sexual harassment. When the plaintiff finally complained, the district re-
moved and reassigned the principal.
The court held that the employer was entitled to prevail on the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, because the plaintiff acted unrea-
sonably by failing to inform the school district of the alleged harassing
conduct when given an express opportunity. 17 The court stated that an
employer conducting a good-faith investigation into sexual harassment
complaints must be able to rely on the evidence obtained during the in-
vestigation. 18 Although the plaintiff claimed that she denied the harass-
ment at first because she was intimidated by the alleged harasser's
presence outside the room where she was interviewed, the court rejected
this argument, relying on the plaintiff's testimony that she was not upset
or under stress during the interview.' 9
In Sharp v. City of Houston,20 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict
finding the Houston police department liable for its supervisors' harass-
ment of a female police officer. Although the department disciplined the
accused harassers by suspending and transferring them, the court deter-
mined that the employer could still be liable under the negligence stan-
dard that it "knew or should have known of the harassment in question
and failed to take prompt remedial action."'2' The court noted that the
jury could have found that the department's anti-harassment policy was
ineffective because there was evidence that the strict chain of command
punished officers who bypassed their immediate superior, even when that
immediate superior was harassing the officer.22 Furthermore, the court
found that the jury could have decided that the plaintiff had suffered re-
taliation by being transferred to a less prestigious position as a result of
the operation of a "code of silence" encouraged by the culture of the
department.23 Because there was evidence that the city made this code a
custom or practice, the court would not disturb the jury's verdict holding
15. See id. at 511.
16. 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999).
17. See id. at 971.
18. See id. at 971-72.
19. See id. at 971.
20. 164 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
21. Id. at 929 (quoting Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir.
1998)). The case was tried prior to the articulation of the new standard for supervisory
liability in Faragher and Ellerth. See id. at 928.




the city liable for the adverse employment action arising out of this
practice.
The issue of sexual favoritism as a basis for a sex discrimination claim
under Title VII and the TCHRA was raised in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Guzman,2 4 a recent case decided by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff Guzman sued Wal-Mart for gender discrimination based on al-
leged preferential treatment of certain female employees by male man-
agement because of the female employees' manner of dress, physical
appearance, and willingness to flirt and socialize with the men. Guzman,
who worked as a cash office clerk, alleged that certain female associates
were awarded additional hours, full-time status, and promotions because
of their attractive appearance, provocative manner of dress, and flirting
and fraternization with male managers.
The appeals court reversed the jury finding of gender discrimination
against Wal-Mart, holding that Guzman failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to support her claim based on the preferential treatment theory.25
The court surveyed federal law on the issue of whether a supervisor's
voluntary sexual relations with a subordinate could support a Title VII
claim for sex discrimination and agreed with the line of cases stating that
"isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual ro-
mantic relationships" do not violate Title VII.2 6 Critically, in the court's
view, the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that all women were treated
differently on the basis of their sex; rather, she claimed that she was
treated unfairly because she was not a "particular kind of woman. '27
Concluding that this was not sufficient to support a claim of sex discrimi-
nation, the court reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment for
Wal-Mart. 28
2. Disability Discrimination
One of the most significant developments in disability discrimination
law over the Survey period was the United States Supreme Court's treat-
ment of Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") cases in its trilogy of
decisions in June of 1999, including Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc. ,29 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. ,30 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg.3' The Court's opinions in Murphy, Sutton, and Albertsons made
clear that the effect of mitigating measures must be considered in analyz-
ing whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
under the statute. The Court rejected guidelines promulgated by the
24. No. 13-97-260-CV (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 8, 1999, pet. denied) (not des-
ignated for publication), 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 2677, *1.
25. See id. at *39-40.
26. Id. at *22-23.
27. Id. at *24.
28. See id. at *40.
29. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
30. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
31. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which state that the miti-
gating effects of medications, prosthetic devices, or treatment should not
be considered in determining whether an individual suffers a substantially
limiting impairment.32 The Court reasoned that the statutory provisions
of the ADA require that an individual be presently substantially limited in
a major life activity and, therefore, impairments must be considered as
corrected in order to accurately determine whether an individual is
disabled.33
Another United States Supreme Court opinion of note during the Sur-
vey period was Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. ,34 in which
the Court settled a long-running circuit split by holding that the pursuit or
receipt of Social Security disability benefits does not automatically estop
a plaintiff from bringing an ADA lawsuit. However, the court required
the plaintiff to explain why a prior statement that she is totally disabled
from working does not preclude her from claiming that she is a qualified
person with a disability under the ADA.35 The Court's holdings in these
four cases will affect the outcome of many disability discrimination cases
on the issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled, especially at the summary
judgment stage.
Several Fifth Circuit cases addressed the ADA's reasonable accommo-
dation requirement. In Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc.,36 the court made
clear that there must be a give-and-take between employer and employee
with respect to reasonable accommodations. In that case, the plaintiff's
job required her to lift and carry containers weighing thirty to fifty
pounds. After suffering a back injury while performing this task, the
plaintiff was medically restricted from carrying containers weighing over
ten pounds. When the plaintiff returned to work from her injury, the
employer attempted to accommodate her restrictions by assigning her
lifting work to other employees, and later by reducing the size and weight
of the containers and proposing a device to reduce plaintiff's lifting and
carrying duties. Although the plaintiff never objected to or commented
on these measures, she resigned and later filed an ADA lawsuit alleging
that the employer had failed to accommodate her back injury.
The Fifth Circuit determined that it was not the employer's duty to
propose accommodations on its own without input or discussion from the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's own unilateral withdrawal from the inter-
32. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1999).
33. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 462.
34. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
35. The result of this decision was felt in Giles v. General Electric Co., No. 3-97-CV-
2774-14, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9369, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 1999), in which the district
court allowed the plaintiff's disability claim to go to the jury despite the employer's estop-
pel argument, which was based on the plaintiff's filing for Social Security Disability Insur-
ance and employer-sponsored disability benefit programs. The court noted that part of the
plaintiff's ADA claim was that he could have performed his job with reasonable accommo-
dation, and none of the disability programs he applied for accounted for reasonable accom-
modations. See id. at *3.
36. 178 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 1999).
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active process caused the breakdown in the process. 37 Accordingly, the
court affirmed judgment for the employer. 38
In a similar case regarding the interactive process, Seaman v. CSPH,
Inc.,39 the court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claims and held
that the employer's various attempts to accommodate the plaintiff's ma-
jor depression were sufficient under the ADA. When the plaintiff sought
time off from work because of his depression, he was granted two days
off each week, relieved of his responsibility to carry a pager, and assigned
to a less responsible position. Because there was no evidence that the
plaintiff sought or was denied any specific accommodation other than
those the employer offered, the court determined that the employee's
ADA claims were correctly dismissed.40
In another case involving the legal question of what constitutes a rea-
sonable accommodation under the ADA, the Fifth Circuit in Burch v.
City of Nacogdoches41 held that the employer was not required to create
a permanent light duty position for an injured firefighter who was unable
to perform his regular duties. The court noted that in order for reassign-
ment to be considered a reasonable accommodation, a vacant position
must exist.42 In addition, the employee could not prevail on the basis of
his argument that the city should have restructured his firefighting job to
accommodate his disability, as the ADA does not require that an em-
ployer relieve an employee of the essential functions of his job.43
Similarly, in a disability discrimination claim brought under the ADA
and the TCHRA in Lopez v. Tyler Refrigeration Corp.,44 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected the ac-
commodations proposed by the plaintiff as unreasonable. The plaintiff in
Lopez was injured at work, resulting in permanent limitations and restric-
tions on lifting as well as the use of his right hand and arm. He was
terminated after the employer determined that he could no longer work
at his assembler job with the permanent restrictions.
The plaintiff contended that he could have accomplished the essential
functions of his assembly line job with either of two accommodations: (1)
continuing the temporary accommodation of allowing him to perform less
strenuous work than that typically required for employees on the assem-
bly line; or (2) the "self-accommodation" of using his left hand and arm
instead of his right, when necessary. The court rejected both of these
proposals in turn, concluding that the "self-accommodation" was unrea-
sonable in that it violated the directive from the plaintiff's physician. 45
37. See id. at 737-38.
38. See id. at 741.
39. 179 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1999).
40. See id. at 301.
41. 174 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 1999).
42. See id. at 620.
43. See id. at 621.
44. No. 3:97-CV-2749-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6270 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 1999).
45. See id. at *9-10.
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The employer was not obligated by the ADA or the TCHRA to accom-
modate the plaintiff by permitting him to use his left hand to lift objects
weighing greater than twenty-five pounds, in direct violation of his per-
manent medical restrictions. Moreover, the employer was not required
to continue permanently the temporary accommodation of allowing the
plaintiff to perform less strenuous work on the assembly line.46 Because
both of the accommodations suggested by the plaintiff were unreasona-
ble, the court determined that he was not a qualified individual with a
disability under the ADA and the TCHRA, and therefore summary judg-
ment for the employer was appropriate. 47
The Fifth Circuit also weighed in regarding the "direct threat" test used
for positions which have safety-related requirements.48 In Rizzo v. Chil-
dren's World Learning Centers, Inc.,49 a plaintiff who had a substantial
hearing impairment was employed at a day care facility and drove stu-
dents to and from school in a van as part of her regular job responsibili-
ties. After a parent complained that her child had been unable to get the
driver's attention and expressed concern that the plaintiff's hearing im-
pairment could prevent her from hearing a child in distress, the employer
relieved the plaintiff of her driving duties, in effect reducing her work
hours and compensation.
The court upheld the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, determining
that the day care center bore the burden of proof to show that the plain-
tiff's hearing impairment posed a "direct threat" to the safety of the chil-
dren.50 Because the employer was unable to show more than a potential
threat, the employer could not bear this burden. The court has accepted
this case for rehearing en banc.51
Summary judgment was affirmed for the employer in Zenor v. El Paso
Healthcare System Ltd.,52 in which a pharmacist was terminated for using
cocaine. In this case, the plaintiff-pharmacist injected himself with co-
caine and was still impaired when it was time for him to report to work.
He called and reported to his supervisor that he was under the influence
of cocaine and could not report to work. Based on this conversation, the
employer arranged for the pharmacist to receive treatment and rehabili-
tation for his drug abuse. Although there was some evidence that the
plaintiff was assured he would have a job when he returned from rehabili-
46. See id. at *11-12.
47. See id. at *13-14.
48. The "direct threat" provision of the ADA allows employers a defense if they can
show that an individual is not qualified because, as a result of his disability, he poses a
significant risk to the health and safety of others. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998).
49. 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999) reh'g en banc granted, 187 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 1999).
50. Rizzo, 173 F.3d at 259-60. The court stated that the burden is normally on the
plaintiff to prove that she is not a direct threat to herself or others, except when an em-
ployer's safety requirements "tend to screen out" disabled individuals. At that point, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove that the employee is a direct threat. Id.
51. See 187 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 1999).
52. 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999).
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tation, the employer decided during the period of rehabilitation that it
was too risky for the pharmacist to continue working around controlled
substances, including pharmaceutical cocaine. The employer informed
the pharmacist that he would remain employed until his medical leave
expired, then would be terminated.
In support of his ADA lawsuit, the pharmacist argued that he came
within the "safe harbor" provision of the ADA, since he had entered
treatment for his drug use approximately five weeks prior to his termina-
tion.53 However, the court held that the safe harbor provision did not
apply, as the pharmacist had not been drug-free for a significant length of
time when he was notified of his termination, and thus he was correctly
considered by the employer to be "currently" engaging in the illegal use
of drugs.54 Accordingly, the pharmacist was not a qualified individual
with a disability and was not entitled to protection under the ADA.
3. Race and National Origin Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an at-will employment
relationship constitutes a "contract" for purposes of section 1981 in
Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Association of Lubbock, Inc. 55 The Afri-
can-American plaintiff in that case filed complaints with both the EEOC
and the Texas Commission on Human Rights, alleging that her employer
engaged in racially discriminatory practices in the workplace. Both agen-
cies denied the complaint based on lack of jurisdiction because the em-
ployer had less than fifteen employees. The employee was fired after her
complaint was dismissed.
The employee then sued for race discrimination under section 1981, but
the district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the em-
ployee could not establish an essential element of her claim, namely, the
existence of a contract. The court reviewed Texas law to determine
whether an admittedly at-will relationship could be a contract for pur-
poses of section 1981. The court concluded that it was, citing a Texas
Supreme Court case recognizing that an at-will employment relationship
is a contract for purposes of a tortious interference with contract claim.56
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the employer.
Another significant case brought pursuant to section 1981 involved a
franchisor's liability for the discriminatory acts of its franchisee's employ-
ees. In Arguello v. Conoco, Inc.,57 the Northern District of Texas granted
53. The "safe harbor" provision of the ADA provides that "the term 'qualified indi-
vidual with a disability' shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engag-
ing in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." 42
U.S.C. § 12114(a) (West 1995).
54. See Zenor, 176 F.3d at 856.
55. 160 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1998).
56. See id. at 1050 (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex.
1989)).
57. No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-0638-H, 1998 WL 713277 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7,1998).
[Vol. 53
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
summary judgment for the employer gas company for the allegedly ra-
cially discriminatory acts of employees at a station owned and operated
by the gas company. Several plaintiffs who alleged that they had exper-
ienced discriminatory treatment by cashiers and clerks at various stores
operated by the defendant or its franchisees filed a class action suit under
section 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as well as Texas state law claims.
The court found that the issue to be decided was whether an agency
relationship existed between the franchisor and the franchisee, such that
the acts of the franchisee could be considered the acts of the franchisor.
58
The court reviewed the marketing agreement between the franchisor gas
company and the franchisee stores and determined that the agreement
expressly disclaimed the existence of an agency relationship between the
gas company and the store. Because the plaintiffs produced no evidence
to the contrary, the court concluded that no agency relationship existed
between the gas company and the franchisee stores and, thus, employees
of the franchisee stores likewise were not agents of the gas company.
59
The court also considered the claims of some of the plaintiffs against a
particular company-owned store, and found that the plaintiffs failed to
produce summary judgment evidence that the cashier was aided in ac-
complishing the tort by the existence of her relationship with the defen-
dant gas company. Accordingly, the court ruled that the gas company
was not liable for the cashier's actions as a matter of law.
60
In Deines v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services,61
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the employer in a
national origin discrimination case arising under Title VII. The plaintiff,
who had sought to prove that the employer failed to hire him because of
his national origin, argued that the jury instruction given by the district
court improperly placed a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's reasons for rejecting him were pretextual.
The jury was instructed that "disparities in qualifications are not
enough in and of themselves to demonstrate discriminatory intent unless
those disparities are so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap
you in the face."' 62 Noting that this language closely tracked the language
contained in Scott v. University of Mississippi,63 the Fifth Circuit ap-
proved of this instruction as a way to emphasize that disparities in qualifi-
cations between job candidates do not evidence discrimination unless
they are of such magnitude that no reasonable person could have chosen
the candidate selected rather than the plaintiff. The court held that the
district court's instructions properly informed the jury that its task was
not to scrutinize the employer's judgment, but to decide whether its deci-
58. See id. at *5.
59. See id. at *5-6.
60. See id. at *7.
61. 164 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 280.
63. 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998).
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sion was discriminatory. 64
4. Age Discrimination
The importance of using correct language in a jury charge is shown in
Toennies v. Quantum Chemical Corp.,65 a recent decision from the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals. In that case, the plaintiff-employee had worked
for a company for years when the defendant corporation purchased the
company. Over the next few years, the plaintiff received favorable evalu-
ations and was promoted. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff's evalua-
tions began slipping and a new supervisor gave the plaintiff the lowest
possible score, which endangered his job. The new supervisor eventually
put the fifty-five-year-old plaintiff on a three-month improvement plan,
but then terminated him less than three months later and replaced him
with an employee aged thirty-three.
At the trial of the plaintiff's age discrimination claim under the
TCHRA, the trial court submitted a charge asking the jury to decide if
the employee was discharged "because of" his age rather than asking
whether age was a "motivating factor" in his discharge. The appellate
court reversed and remanded the case, ruling that the jury charge was
incorrect and "probably caused the rendition of an improper judg-
ment."'66 The court concluded that the word "because" is ambiguous, as
it could mean solely or partially because of a particular factor.67 The rul-
ing was partially based on the fact that the jury sent a note during deliber-
ations, evidencing confusion over the standard of causation. Moreover,
the employee's requested instruction, which the trial court rejected,
closely tracked the language in the TCHRA and the Texas Pattern Jury
Charge.
In recent years, employers have enjoyed considerable success in por-
traying potentially discriminatory statements made by managers as "stray
remarks." Such remarks have been held insufficient to create an infer-
ence of discrimination where they are remote in time from the adverse
employment action and made by a person who did not make the adverse
employment decision.68 In Haas v. ADVO Systems, Inc.,69 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that an interviewer's comments to a rejected job applicant that
his only concern about hiring the applicant was his age was not a mere
"stray remark." In Haas, the plaintiff applied for a sales manager posi-
tion and was interviewed by the vice president of sales, who told the
plaintiff that his only concern about hiring plaintiff was his age. The
plaintiff also interviewed with the regional vice president, who had ulti-
mate hiring authority, but the company selected a thirty-four year-old ap-
64. See Deines, 164 F.3d at 282.
65. 998 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. filed Oct. 18, 1999).
66. Id. at 379 (quoting TEX. R. Ap. P. 44.1(a)(1)).
67. See id. at 378.
68. See, e.g., EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996);
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).
69. 168 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 1999).
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plicant and told the plaintiff that the decision was based on the younger
candidate's "better chemistry."
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the employer, finding that the remark was closely connected to
the employment decision, rather than "vague and remote in time."' 70 The
court determined that it was reasonable to infer that, based on the re-
mark, the "chemistry" referred to by the employer had to do with plain-
tiff's age. Moreover, the court rejected the employer's argument that the
vice president of sales exerted no influence over the regional vice presi-
dent's ultimate employment decision. 7'
The Fifth Circuit examined in Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc. 72 the ques-
tions of whether and how to stay proceedings where a plaintiff has simul-
taneously filed identical actions under the TCHRA in state court and
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in federal
court. The plaintiff filed an ADEA claim in federal court and filed a state
court action based on the very same facts under the TCHRA.
The court applied a balancing test and determined that there were no
exceptional circumstances requiring the district court to decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction over the suit.73 Thus, it was an abuse of discretion for
the district court to stay the federal proceedings pending resolution of the
state court proceedings. The court came to this conclusion despite the
plaintiff's argument that, if the state court found that the plaintiff had
failed to comply with TCHRA deadlines, the case would have to proceed
in federal court.74 The court also determined that the district court was
correct in failing to stay the state court action, as there was no federal or
state statutory provision, nor any congressional authorization, allowing a
federal court to stay parallel state court actions.75 Accordingly, the court
reversed the abstention stay order and remanded the case to the federal
district court.
5. Retaliation
The Dallas Court of Appeals, in a sharp departure from Fifth Circuit
law interpreting Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, determined in City
of Dallas v. Rodriguez76 that the TCHRA does not require a plaintiff to
show an employer's retaliatory conduct rises to the level of an "ultimate
employment decision" to prevail on a retaliation claim under the Texas
anti-discrimination statute. Plaintiff, the business manager of a city-
owned and operated radio station, sued the City of Dallas alleging sex
discrimination for failing to promote her and retaliation for having filed
70. Id. at 733-34.
71. See id. at 734.
72. 168 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1999).
73. See id. at 739.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 740.
76. No. 05-97-00280-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6763 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.h.).
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an EEOC charge alleging sex discrimination. The jury failed to find dis-
crimination, but found the City liable on the retaliation claim, awarding
the plaintiff approximately $160,000.
On appeal, the court considered the legal and factual sufficiency of the
jury's finding on retaliation. The court first determined that the plaintiff
had presented evidence of three primary acts of retaliation after filing her
EEOC claim: 1) the general manager hired for the job the plaintiff sought
berated her in front of other employees and was hostile and unprofes-
sional toward her; 2) the general manager gave the plaintiff a written rep-
rimand for unsatisfactory performance, although the plaintiff had never
before received a reprimand in eleven years with the City; and 3) the
general manager did not permit the plaintiff to exercise her authority by
terminating a probationary employee who worked directly under the
plaintiff.77 Plaintiff also presented additional evidence supporting an in-
ference of retaliation by way of testimony and evidence of a "culture of
retaliation" fostered by City management. 78
The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was legally and
factually sufficient for the jury to conclude that retaliation occurred.79
Moreover, the court rejected the City's argument that the plaintiff failed
to prove damages because the retaliation complained of did not result in
any adverse personnel action.80 The court noted first that the plaintiff
testified that she felt compelled to resign as a result of the retaliation,
from which the jury could have concluded that she was constructively
discharged-unquestionably an ultimate employment decision.81 Second,
the court viewed the letter of reprimand as an adverse employment ac-
tion that had an immediate effect upon the plaintiff's employment.82 The
court based its reasoning on the fact that, under City personnel rules, the
reprimand could be used as a basis for suspending the plaintiff in the
future without the need to first provide her with a formal reprimand. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most significantly, the court agreed with the plaintiff's
contention that the anti-retaliation provision in the TCHRA is broader
than the provision found in the corresponding federal statute, Title VII. 83
77. See id., at *10-11.
78. See id., at *12, 15-16.
79. See id., at *14.
80. See id. at *17.
81. See id.
82. See Rodriguez, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6763, at *17-18.
83. The Texas statute reads:
An employer ... commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer
... retaliates or discriminates against a person who ...
(1) opposes a discriminatory practice;
(2) makes or files a charge;
(3) files a complaint; or
(4) testifies, assists, or participates in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon 1996).
The corresponding federal provision reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he
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Because the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits only "dis-
crimination," while the Texas statute prohibits both "discrimination" and
"retaliation," the court concluded that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff
to show that the City's conduct resulted in an ultimate employment deci-
sion to recover for retaliation.
8 4
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered the boundaries of "op-
positional activity" under the TCHRA in Graves v. Komet.8 5 The plain-
tiff was a supervisor who reported a subordinate's sexual harassment
problem with another employee to higher management. The employer
investigated the matter, disciplined the accused harasser, and prepared a
document for the complaining employee's signature to verify that the
matter had been resolved to the employee's satisfaction. The supervisor
opposed having the complaining employee sign the document, which the
supervisor viewed as a release of the complainant's potential claims
against the employer. Shortly thereafter, the employer terminated the
supervisor for poor performance and resulting financial losses. Plaintiff
argued that the employer retaliated against her for her oppositional activ-
ity of bringing the complaining employee's complaint to the attention of
upper management and for opposing the signing of the "release."
The court rejected this argument, instead holding that the plaintiff's act
of reporting the complaint was a ministerial task required of her by virtue
of her position as a supervisor, and was, therefore, not protected con-
duct.86 In other words, the supervisor's reporting of the sexual harass-
ment complaint was not merely the "product of her own indignance," but
was part of her job responsibilities. 87 Moreover, the court held that al-
though the plaintiff's opposition to having her subordinate sign the pur-
ported release might be considered protected activity, depending upon
what the document said, there was insufficient evidence of this, as plain-
tiff had failed to introduce the document or the contents of the
document. 88
B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATION
One of the factors considered by Texas courts in determining whether a
causal connection exists in retaliation claims brought under section 451 of
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act is the proximity in time between
the filing of a workers' compensation claim and the adverse employment
action suffered by the plaintiff.89 The Dallas Court of Appeals clarified
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this sub-
chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
84. See Rodriguez, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6783 at *18.
85. 982 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
86. See id. at 555.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 556.
89. Section 451.001 of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act provides:
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this factor in Bihonegne v. Chrysler Technologies Airborne Systems,
Inc.,90 in which the court held that a close proximity (two and one-half
months) between the filing of a workers' compensation claim and an em-
ployee's discharge was not enough, standing alone, to raise an inference
of retaliation. The employer also advanced a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the plaintiff's discharge, namely, application of a nondis-
criminatory leave of absence policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the employer.91
Conversely, in Noble v. Southwestern Public Service Co.,92 the
Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed a take-nothing verdict against the
plaintiff on his workers' compensation retaliation claim, based primarily
on evidence that the allegedly discriminatory adverse personnel action
occurred within a few days of the filing of his compensation claim. The
court noted evidence establishing that the employer sent the plaintiff
home on reduced-pay leave only a few weeks after the plaintiff filed a
claim with the Texas Workforce Commission, and only days after learning
that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement and had
an impairment rating of ten percent. In the court's words, "[t]he close
proximity of Noble's compensation claim and the change in Noble's sta-
tus coupled with SPSC's knowledge of the injury and the claim gives rise
to an inference that Noble was forced out of employment because he
filed a compensation claim."' 93 Based on this analysis, the court con-
cluded the issue should have gone to the jury for decision.94
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that attorney's fees are not recover-
able under the statutory predecessor to section 451 in Holland v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc..95 The court stated that former article 8307c of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes authorizes workers' compensation claimants
to recover "reasonable damages" in workers' compensation retaliation
cases, but it does not explicitly authorize attorney's fees. 96 The court
noted its consistent holdings that, unless permitted by statute or contract,
a prevailing party cannot recover attorney's fees from an opposing
party.97 Presumably, the same lack of specific language allowing attor-
A person may not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee because the employee has:
(1) filed a workers' compensation claim in good faith;
(2) hired a lawyer to represent the employee in a claim;
(3) instituted or caused to be instituted in good faith a proceeding under
Subtitle A; or
(4) testified or is about to testify in a proceeding under Subtitle A.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (West 1996).
90. No. 05-96-02031-CV, 1999 WL 62390 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. i 1, 1999, no pet.).
91. See id. at *4.
92. No. 07-97-0212-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7997 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 23,
1998, pet. denied).
93. Id. at *8.
94. See id.
95. 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999).
96. See id. at 95; see also, Act of May 7, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 115, 1971 Tex. Gen.
Laws 884 (repealed 1993).
97. See Holland, 1 S.W.3d at 95.
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ney's fees in the current version of the statute, section 451.002 of the
Texas Labor Code, will lead to the same result in cases brought under
section 451 rather than article 8307c.
The Houston Court of Appeals examined the standard for recovery of
punitive damages under section 451 in Stevens v. National Education Cen-
ters, Inc.98 In that case, the plaintiff presented testimony from a fellow
employee that supervisors for her former employer accused the plaintiff
of faking her injury and malingering and were told to dig up information
to substantiate a charge against the plaintiff. The plaintiff also testified
that her relationship with her supervisor deteriorated and noted that her
supervisor failed to contact her in the hospital or at home while she was
out with an injury. The jury awarded the plaintiff $71,200 in actual dam-
ages and $2.5 million in punitive damages.99
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's grant of JNOV for the em-
ployer on the issue of punitive damages. 00 The court explained that an
employer's violation of section 451 is unlawful, but is not enough, stand-
ing alone, to impose punitive damages. 101 The plaintiff had produced evi-
dence that her supervisors were angry and disliked her, that they thought
she was faking her injury, and that her supervisor failed to call her at the
hospital or at home while she was injured. On reviewing the evidence,
the court found there was not enough evidence to conclude that the em-
ployer egregiously violated the Texas Labor Code merely by expressing
doubt and anger about the employee's injury.10 2
In Baptist Memorial Healthcare System v. Casanova,10 3 a jury initially
found that the employer discharged the plaintiff, a physical therapist aide,
and discriminated against him in violation of section 451 of the Texas
Labor Code because he filed a workers' compensation claim. The em-
ployer had adopted a policy limiting employee leaves of absence to six
months, as well as a light duty policy for employees with workers' com-
pensation injuries. After the policies were adopted, the plaintiff injured
his lower back and was placed on light duty in accordance with the light
duty policy.
The plaintiff later fractured his right ankle at work and was declared
medically unable to work. He stayed off work for approximately three
months, at which time his doctor certified that he was medically able to
return to light duty work with specific restrictions (no prolonged stand-
ing, lifting, stooping, climbing, or bending). The plaintiff did not receive a
light duty desk job meeting those restrictions, and the light duty release
was revoked by his doctor a few weeks later, whereupon the plaintiff was
not again released to work until the following year.
98. 990 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
99. See id. at 374.
100. See id. at 377.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. No. 04-97-00756-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 3176 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr.
28, 1999, pet. denied).
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Applying its six-month maximum leave policy, the employer dis-
charged the plaintiff, who had been on workers' compensation leave for
at least six months. The court of appeals applied the "no evidence" stan-
dard and determined that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence at trial
to show that the employer did not apply its leave of absence policy uni-
formly. 10 4 Moreover, the court found no evidence establishing that the
employer treated the plaintiff differently than employees who did not file
workers' compensation claims or that a position meeting plaintiff's work
restrictions was available. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment
and rendered judgment in the employer's favor. 10 5
C. TEXAS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT CLAIMS
The Houston Court of Appeals considered the applicability of sover-
eign immunity to claims brought under the Whistleblower Act in Univer-
sity of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Hohman.10 6 Nurses
employed in the emergency department of the defendant employer al-
leged that, after they voiced concerns to hospital administration about the
practice of submitting patients to unnecessary trauma procedures, their
employer retaliated against them by harassing and intimidating them,
withholding evaluations, reprimanding them, and attempting to discredit
them professionally.
The court first ruled on the issue whether the nurses had stated a cause
of action which fell within the waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Whistleblower Act. 10 7 The court rejected the employer's argument that a
constructive discharge did not constitute an "adverse personnel action" as
defined by the Act. 108 Deciding that a constructive discharge is a termi-
nation for purposes of the Act, the court followed its reasoning in Nguyen
v. Technical & Scientific Application, Inc.10 9 and held that by pleading
that they were constructively discharged, the nurses met the "termina-
tion" requirement of the Whistleblower Act.110 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the trial court's ruling denying the employer's plea to the juris-
diction on those claims.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
It was a busy year for the courts in cases involving First Amendment
claims, especially those requiring an analysis of whether the speech at
104. See id. at *12-13.
105. See id. at *16.
106. No. 01-98-01382-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8808 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Nov. 24, 1999, no pet. h.), superseding 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 6715 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, no. pet. h.). The nurses also brought claims under the Nurse Reporting
Act and common law claims, which were dismissed by the court. See id. at *31-32.
107. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 554.0035 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
108. Hohman, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8808, at *6.
109. 981 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist. ] 1998, no pet.) Nguyen is
discussed in greater detail at notes 185-87, infra.
110. Hohman, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 8808, at *8.
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issue was private or involved a matter of public concern."n In Harris v.
Victoria Independent School District,112 the plaintiffs, as a group of teach-
ers, brought a First Amendment claim against the school district for retal-
iating against them for their exercise of protected speech. The teachers,
who were faculty representatives on a committee which included parents,
community members, and business representatives, reported at a commit-
tee meeting that the faculty believed the school principal was failing to
follow the committee's improvement plan and that a new principal was
needed. The school superintendent, upon learning of these remarks, rep-
rimanded and transferred the plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the school district's argument that the plain-
tiffs' speech was on a purely personal matter and therefore unprotected.
Rather, the court determined that because the plaintiffs were fulfilling
their duties as committee representatives at the time the remarks were
made, their speech was protected under the First Amendment.11 3 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the school district was liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the plaintiffs' damages, as its policymakers on the
school board had approved the retaliatory action taken by the
superintendent. 114
The Waco Court of Appeals came to a different result in construing a
freedom of speech claim brought pursuant to article I, section 8 of the
Texas Constitution in Bates v. Texas State Technical College.115 In Bates, a
college instructor alleged he was fired in retaliation for hiring an attorney
to represent him in a contract dispute with his employer. The court held
that his alleged exercise of free speech and the hiring of an attorney in-
volved a matter of personal interest to the plaintiff, and not a matter of
public concern.116
Teague v. City of Flower Mound1 7 is a First Amendment case involving
"mixed speech," or speech which involves both private and public con-
cerns. In that case, the plaintiffs were police officers who began investi-
gating a fellow officer whom they suspected of wrongdoing. Believing
that the police chief was attempting to hinder the investigation and cover
up the misconduct, the plaintiffs filed a grievance. Subsequently, they
were discharged and then filed suit, claiming that their First Amendment
rights had been violated.
The court, in affirming summary judgment for the city, observed that
the plaintiffs' speech involved both public concern (i.e., police miscon-
duct) and private concerns (i.e., conditions of the officers' employ-
111. In order for a public employee to demonstrate a violation of his freedom of
speech, he must first demonstrate that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
112. 168 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 533 (1999).
113. See id. at 222-23.
114. See id. at 225.
115. 983 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied).
116. See id. at 830.
117. 179 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1999).
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ment). 118 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their speech
would be entitled to protection if it involved any matter of public concern
and instead applied a three-factor test based on the context, form and
content of the speech.119 Because the court concluded that the context
and form of the speech were predominately private, and because it oc-
curred in the setting of a dispute between employer and employee, the
plaintiffs' speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 120
The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered the district court's denial of
summary judgment on a First Amendment claim against an officer of the
Texas Rangers law enforcement agency in Steadman v. Texas Rangers.121
The plaintiff in that case applied to be one of Texas' first female Texas
Rangers and scored among the highest on the written employment exam.
According to the evidence, prior to the plaintiff's interview, the defen-
dant officer who served as chair of the interview committee requested the
scores of female candidates, which was a violation of agency policy. Sub-
sequently, the officer allegedly stated that he did not want to hire plaintiff
because he believed her to be "too independent" and "too opinion-
ated. 1 22 He reportedly said that she had been blackballed because she
was a "woman's libber" and pressured two other interviewers to change
their scores, effectively denying the plaintiff employment with the
Rangers.' 23
The candidate sued the agency and the officer, claiming that she had
been retaliated against on the basis of her protected speech, political be-
liefs, expressions and associations. Despite significant evidence that the
officer deliberately rigged the selection process so the plaintiff would not
be selected, the Fifth Circuit accepted the officer's arguments that the
plaintiff had not engaged in protected speech or activity and concluded
there was no evidence linking the plaintiff to any feminist causes or orga-
nizations.1 24 Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of
the officer's motion for summary judgment.125
IV. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Following the Texas Supreme Court's recent ruling in Montgomery
County Hospital District v. Brown,126 in which the court restated there is
a strong presumption against modification of the employment-at-will
rule, employers prevailed in most, but not all, cases in which a plaintiff
attempted to show the employer made a binding promise of job security.
118. See id. at 383.
119. See id. at 381-82.
120. See id. at 383.
121. 179 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Sheppart v. Cook, 120 S. Ct. 933 (2000).
122. Id. at 364.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 368-69.
125. See id. at 369.
126. 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998).
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied Brown in a promissory es-
toppel case in Gilmartin v. KVTV-Channel 13.127 The plaintiff in that
case alleged that he entered into an oral agreement with the employer
television station that he would be employed as station manager, and that
his contract would be automatically renewed every year if his work was
satisfactory. The plaintiff also alleged that he was told that a one to
three-year commitment to the television station was "very doable" and
that no written agreement was necessary. 128
The court determined that an oral promise to an at-will employee can-
not serve as the basis for a promissory estoppel claim unless the promise
is specific, unequivocal, and definite. 129 Based on Brown, the court con-
cluded the promises alleged by the plaintiff included nothing specific or
definite enough upon which reliance could reasonably be made.130
The plaintiff in Wegner v. Dell Computer Corp.131 alleged that his em-
ployer had breached an implied promise of annual employment, arguing
that he was hired for a one-year term of employment that was subse-
quently renewed from year to year. The court rejected the plaintiff's ar-
gument that mere eligibility for an annual bonus, which was not
guaranteed, implied that employment was for a one-year term.132
The court also rejected the plaintiff's second theory, by which he al-
leged that he relied on statements regarding his continuing participation
in a fiscal year bonus plan. The court found these statements too vague
to constitute clear and specific expressions of intent, and further found
that there were several express statements in various employment docu-
ments that his employment was "at will."'133 However, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he was terminated "for cause," such that he would be entitled to
severance pay under the employer's written policy.134 Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiff's third theory, by which he argued that the employer
violated an exception to the employment-at-will rule by discharging him
for the purpose of interfering with his eligibility for benefits. The court
cited McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.' 35 and noted that no such excep-
tion has been recognized under Texas law. 136
127. 985 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
128. Id. at 556.
129. See id. at 558.
130. See id. at 559.
131. No. 03-99-00028-CV, 1999 WL 645086 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.
h.).
132. Compare Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. Wegner, 1999 WL 645086, at * 4. Examples of the express statements were con-
tained in the plaintiff's employment application, his employment agreement, his stock op-
tion agreements, and his performance improvement plan, all of which were signed by the
plaintiff. See id. at *2-3.
134. Id, at *5.
135. 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991).
136. See Wegner, 1999 WL 645086, at *6.
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Again applying the dictates of Brown, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
reversed a $40,000 judgment against an employer in a wrongful termina-
tion suit, Dawson Production Services, Inc. v. Sims. 137 After reviewing
the record for legal sufficiency, the court determined that there was no
evidence indicating that the oral agreement alleged by plaintiff created an
enforceable oral contract overcoming the at-will status. 138 The plaintiff
testified at trial that he was promised by the company's vice-president
that as long as he satisfactorily performed his job, he would remain em-
ployed with the company. Following the precedent set by Brown, the
court concluded that these general comments did not manifest an intent
to modify the at-will relationship.1 39
Not all of the employment-at-will case law following in the wake of
Brown has been favorable to employers, however. In Miksch v. Exxon
Corp.,140 the court determined that a fact issue existed as to whether a
plaintiff's at-will status was modified by oral assurances. The employer
had a policy prohibiting employees from being involved in activities that
would constitute a conflict of interest with the employer's business.
Nonetheless, plaintiff, who worked at the employer's gas station, alleged
that her supervisor had orally assured her that her husband's operation of
a competing gas station would not be a problem. Despite this oral prom-
ise, the employee was later informed that she was in violation of the com-
pany's conflict of interest policy and that her spouse would have to
relinquish control of his competing gas station in order for the plaintiff to
continue working for the employer. Plaintiff refused and was terminated
under the conflict policy. The court applied Brown and determined that
the alleged statement by the supervisor might be sufficiently specific, une-
quivocal, and definite, as required to modify an employee's at-will sta-
tus.141 Thus, summary judgment was precluded. 142
In an interesting twist on the usual set of facts, in Harrison v. Gemdrill
International, Inc., 143 an employer took the unusual step of suing its em-
ployee for breach of contact for resigning with little advance notice and
for persuading his replacement to join him in working for a different em-
ployer. The result was not a good one for the employer, as the employee
then presented a wage claim against the employer as a counterclaim to
the employer's lawsuit. The trial court entered a take-nothing verdict
against both employer and employee, and the employee appealed. The
appellate court held that the employee conclusively established that he
was entitled to unpaid wages from the employer and awarded attorney's
fees as well, presumably not the outcome the employer was hoping for
137. No. 09-97-308-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 2403 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Apr. 1,
1999, no pet.).
138. See id. at *3.
139. See id. at *34.
140. 979 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
141. See id. at 705.
142. See id.
143. 981 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
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when it filed sUit. 1 44 This case shows that the "at-will" doctrine can work
both ways; not only is the employer free to end the employment relation-
ship at any time, but so is the employee.
B. ESTOPPEL/RELEASES/WAIVERS
In a case in which a signed receipt might have gone a long way toward
preventing litigation, the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Franks v. Brook-
shire Brothers, Inc. 145 determined that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether a release signed by an employee was supported by
proper consideration. According to the evidence presented at the sum-
mary judgment stage, the plaintiff injured his arm while stacking ice at
the defendant's ice plant, after which he was diagnosed with tendinitis
and given a release to return to light duty. A few days later, the plaintiff
injured his shoulder when he was required to lift some heavy items. He
again saw his doctor, who took him off work.
After a subsequent surgery on his shoulder, the plaintiff returned to
work on light duty status and was told by the employer that he would be
given his old job back when he received a full medical release. However,
according to the plaintiff, once he received a medical release he was told
by the company's safety coordinator that he must sign a form releasing
the company from any claims having to do with an accident that had oc-
curred at work several months before. There was no evidence that the
plaintiff was told he must sign the release to keep his job, but nonetheless
the plaintiff claimed that he believed he had no choice but to sign the
release to keep his job and to return to his previous position.
Although ten dollars was recited as the consideration for execution of
the release, the plaintiff presented summary judgment evidence that he
was never paid the ten dollars. Unfortunately for the employer, it did not
or could not refute this assertion, and the court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment for the employer, finding that the plaintiff
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was any
consideration for the release. 146
C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
As the only recent Texas Supreme Court decision to uphold a finding
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in an employment setting,
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce,147 is a landmark case for employment
practitioners. In Bruce, the Supreme Court upheld an award of
$100,000.00 for actions taken by a supervisor toward three of his employ-
ees. In Bruce, plaintiffs presented evidence alleging that the supervisor
screamed, cursed, threatened, physically intimidated, and degraded his
employees daily over a two-and-one-half year period. On a daily basis,
144. See id. at 718-19.
145. 986 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
146. See id. at 378.
147. 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999).
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he reportedly would get within an inch of his employees' faces and
scream, curse and threaten them, tell obscene and vulgar jokes, physically
terrorize his employees, and attack them in a rage. He allegedly humili-
ated his employees by having them stand in his office and staring at them
for thirty minutes at a time, and by requiring them to perform janitorial
tasks that were not within their regular job duties.
The key to the court's decision in this case appears to be the repeated
and ongoing pattern of abusive conduct over a period of years. The court
focused on the cumulative quantity and quality of the conduct as a whole,
rather than whether each individual instance was extreme and outra-
geous.148 The court also determined that the employer was vicariously
liable for the supervisor's actions, because the supervisor was acting in his
role as a manager when he committed the offensive acts. 149 Moreover,
the supervisor was a vice-principal of the company, as he had the author-
ity to employ, direct, and discharge the company's employees and had
been given the management of an entire department of the employer. 150
Near the same time Bruce was handed down, the Texas Supreme Court
also issued its decision in Brewerton v. Dalrymple,15 1 another intentional
infliction of emotional distress case. In that case, the court reversed the
Austin Court of Appeals and determined that the trial court had been
correct in granting summary judgment for the individual defendants on
the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.152 In
Dalrymple, the plaintiff, a college professor seeking tenure, presented ev-
idence that he was given negative evaluations for failing to publish aca-
demic articles, while other faculty were not similarly negatively
evaluated. 153 The plaintiff further claimed that had been given an exces-
sive workload and was repeatedly denied tenure and merit raises.1 5 4 The
plaintiff also asserted he was unconstitutionally prohibited from disclos-
ing the contents of his tenure file. 155
The Supreme Court restated the standards for a finding of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent
which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized
by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. 56
Applying this standard to the facts of Dalrymple, the Supreme Court
held that the conduct about which the plaintiff complained did not rise to
148. See id. at 615-16.
149. See id. at 618.
150. See id.
151. 997 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).




156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
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the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, "[e]ven assuming that the
defendants had retaliatory motives." 157
Another significant intentional infliction of emotional distress case,
Lyon v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc.,158 dealt with the issue of
whether an employer could be liable for its manager's admittedly tortious
conduct toward the plaintiff employee. In Lyon, a manager stole from
the employer and then accused the plaintiff of the theft and fired her in
order to conceal his activities. The manager later committed suicide
when his wrongdoing was discovered. Although the employer offered to
rehire the plaintiff, she sued for defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on the manager's actions.
The court stated the general rule that an employer is liable for the torts
of its employees committed in the scope of general authority in the fur-
therance of the employer's business.159 Although the manager did have
authority to fire the plaintiff, the manager's tortious acts were "factually
independent" from the act of discharging the plaintiff.160 Because the
discharge itself was not alleged to be unlawful, the employer was not lia-
ble for the manager's torts.161
D. DEFAMATION
In Heiser v. Eckerd Corp.,162 the plaintiff was discharged from his job
as a sales and delivery driver for a snack food company after a store man-
ager from Eckerd reported to the plaintiff's employer that the plaintiff
had taken outdated products from the store without providing a credit
voucher for those products. Later, the store manager met a prospective
employer of the plaintiff at a baseball game, where she warned the pro-
spective employer that if the plaintiff had stolen from Eckerd, he would
steal from the future employer, too. At issue on appeal was whether the
manager was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the
time the statement was made. Because the plaintiff failed to provide any
evidence as to the store manager's general authority to communicate with
prospective employers, the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
in favor of the defendant. 163
In Leatherman v. Rangel,164 a case involving "anticipatory defama-
tion," the Texarkana Court of Appeals ruled that there is no such cause
of action. In that case, the director of a county department investigated a
situation in which a letter criticizing the department and several of its
supervisors was sent to local district judges. After discovering that an
employee of the department had helped write the letter, the director fired
157. Brewerton, 997 S.W.2d at 216.
158. 997 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
159. See id. at 347.
160. Id. at 348
161. See id.
162. 983 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
163. See id. at 316.
164. 986 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
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the employee and drafted a termination memorandum stating that the
employee engaged in unethical and unprofessional conduct and that her
actions called into question her character, integrity, and loyalty as an em-
ployee. The memo was given only to the employee, with a copy placed
into her employment file.
The employee sued the director for defamation and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The appellate court upheld the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the director, explaining that quali-
fied privilege applied, as the director's statements involved a subject in
which he had an interest or duty to another person with similar interests
and duties. 165 In addition, the employee failed to show actual malice or
that the director believed the allegations were false.
Furthermore, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the contents of the termination memo, which was placed in her employ-
ment file, might be disclosed in the future. The appellate court held that,
to the extent the plaintiff sought relief based upon facts that had not yet
occurred, no live controversy existed between the parties. 166
E. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
The plaintiff in Hardy v. Dayton Hudson Corp.16 7 sued her employer,
Target stores, over an alleged promise of a job transfer. The plaintiff sold
her house and moved from Houston to Dallas based on an understanding
that she was to receive a transfer but failed to be selected for the position.
The plaintiff lived in Houston and worked as an executive secretary for
Target for thirteen years. In 1996, the plaintiff's supervisor, a Houston
regional director, told her an executive secretary position was available in
Piano, Texas, under a new regional director for the Dallas area.
The plaintiff expressed interest in the position and spoke to the Dallas
manager about it by telephone. During the telephone conversation, the
plaintiff mentioned she was moving to Dallas. During a later face-to-face
interview, the Dallas manager was not happy with some of the plaintiff's
answers to his questions, and he ultimately hired one of the other four
candidates he interviewed. The plaintiff admitted she knew other candi-
dates were being interviewed. Moreover, about ten days after her inter-
view, the plaintiff sent her Houston manager an e-mail expressing
frustration over waiting for the Dallas manager to make up his mind.
Two weeks later, the plaintiff sold her house and moved to Dallas. The
plaintiff was contacted a few days later and told she had not been selected
for the Plano position.
Applying Texas common law, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas granted Dayton Hudson's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim. First,
the court rejected Dayton Hudson's arguments that the plaintiff could
165. See id. at 762-63.
166. See id. at 763-64.
167. No. CA3:97-CV-2727-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7652 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 1999).
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not bring a negligent misrepresentation claim in the employment-at-will
context. 168 Similarly, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was
not barred by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. 169 The court did
agree with Dayton Hudson's argument that the plaintiff had not demon-
strated reasonable and justifiable reliance, a necessary element of a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim. 170 The key facts leading the court to this
conclusion were that the hiring manager never actually told her that the
Piano job was hers, and the plaintiff's e-mail revealing that she was un-
sure about whether she would get the job but planned to close on her
house anyway. Because the court determined that it was not "reasonable
and justifiable" for the plaintiff to have acted in reliance on her Houston
manager's promise, if any, with regard to the Dallas manager's actions,
the court granted summary judgment for Dayton Hudson. 171
F. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The Texas Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a corporate
officer acts as a third party for the purpose of establishing that a third
party interfered with the contract between the plaintiff and his employer
in Powell Industries, Inc. v. Allen. 172 In this case, the plaintiff, Corbett
Allen, alleged that his employer's CEO intentionally interfered with his
employment contract with the employer by terminating him.
The court determined that a corporate officer acts as a third party only
when he acts "solely in his own interests. ' 173 Proof that an officer has
mixed motives, seeking to benefit both himself and the corporation, is
insufficient to establish that the officer was acting as a third party. In
determining the officer's motives, the court considered the corporation's
evaluation of the agent's actions. Because the board of directors author-
ized the plaintiff's termination and indicated that it was for the benefit of
the corporation, any personal benefit the CEO may have gained from
terminating the plaintiff was not sufficient under the sole motivation re-
quirement. Therefore, the court upheld summary judgment in favor of
the defendant CEO. 174
168. See id. at *16.
169. See id. at *17.
170. See id. at *19-20, citing Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439,
442 (Tex. 1991). Sloane sets forth the elements of negligent misrepresentation as follows:
(1) the representation is made by a defendant in the course of his business, or
in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest; (2) the defendant sup-
plies "false information" for the guidance of others in their business; (3) the
defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information; and (4) the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss
by justifiably relying on the representation.
Sloane, 825 S.W.2d at 442.
171. See Hardy, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7652 at *21.
172. 985 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1998).




G. NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING, RETENTION AND
SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES
The Texas Supreme Court recognized the duty of a company that mar-
kets and sells its products through independent contractor distributors to
reasonably exercise control over those distributors in Read v. Scott Fetzer
Co. 175 The case involved a negligence action brought by a customer who
was raped by a door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman operating as an
independent contractor for The Scott Fetzer Company, otherwise known
as The Kirby Company.
Kirby manufactures vacuum cleaners and distributes them only to inde-
pendent distributors, who are required, under a uniform agreement, to
establish a sales force of door-to-door salespeople exclusively for in-home
demonstration, installation, sales, and service of Kirby vacuums. One of
Kirby's distributors recruited a salesman named Carter but did not check
his references and prior employers. Had the distributor checked, it would
have found that women at Carter's previous places of employment had
complained of Carter's sexually inappropriate behavior and that Carter
had been arrested and received deferred adjudication on a charge of in-
decency with a child, an incident for which he was fired by a previous
employer.
Not long after Carter was hired, he went to the plaintiff's home for an
in-home demonstration, where he later sexually assaulted her. The jury
found Kirby negligent and grossly negligent and rendered judgment
against the company for $160,000 in actual damages and $800,000 in puni-
tive damages.
The court of appeals reversed the punitive damage award, but upheld
the actual damage award. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, noting
that by requiring its distributors to sell vacuum cleaners only through in-
home demonstrations, Kirby retained control of that portion of the dis-
tributor's work and, therefore, was under a legal duty to exercise that
control in a reasonable manner under section 414 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 176
In Continued Care, Inc. v. Fournet,177 the Beaumont Court of Appeals
reversed and rendered an award of $150,000 in damages to a plaintiff (the
decedent's estate) who alleged that the defendant nursing home negli-
gently supervised its employee, causing injury to the decedent. The plain-
tiff contended that a former nursing home employee stole pain
medication that had been prescribed for the decedent-a cancer patient
at the nursing home. The jury found that the employee had stolen the
patient's medication and that the nursing home was negligent in its super-
vision of the employee.
175. 990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1998).
176. See id. at 735.
177. 979 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied).
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The court of appeals, finding that the record contained no more than
"conjecture [and] speculation with regard to the [required] elements of
cause in fact and foreseeability," reversed the jury award.17 8 The court
determined that it was pure speculation to conclude that whenever the
patient complained of pain, that such pain was the "natural and probable
result" of the employee being negligently supervised. 179 Furthermore,
there was undisputed evidence that the former employee's supervisor was
not aware of the employee's dependency on opiates at the relevant time.
Thus, there was legally insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding
of negligent supervision.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Waco Court of Appeals and
rendered judgment for the employer in Walls Regional Hospital v. Bo-
mar.'80 The plaintiffs, three nurses, sued their employer, a hospital, for
negligently allowing a physician with staff privileges to sexually harass
them at work. The nurses claimed the doctor had sexually harassed them
on numerous occasions. The plaintiffs sued based on negligence theories
of sexual harassment for the hospital's failure to keep the workplace safe
and negligence in hiring the doctor.
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision, and granted
summary judgment for the hospital.' 8 ' The court restated the rule that
the "[Texas] Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy
for employees' injuries sustained in the course of their employment ... if
the injuries are compensable under the Act."' 82 The court noted that the
"personal animosity" exception to the Act's exclusivity provision is in-
tended to exclude from coverage injuries resulting from disputes in em-
ployees' private lives which they bring into the place of employment. 83
An analysis of the plaintiffs' allegations in the summary judgment evi-
dence led the court to conclude that the assaults of which the plaintiffs
complained had nothing to do with their personal lives and in fact never
occurred outside the workplace. Accordingly, the court determined that
the summary judgment record established that the plaintiffs' injuries oc-
curred in the course of their employment, and therefore the Workers'
Compensation Act barred their negligence action against the hospital.' 84
H. SABINE PILOT CLAIMS
Claims brought under the Sabine Pilot exception' 8 5 to the employ-
178. Id. at 422-23.
179. Id. at 422.
180. No. 99-9957, 1999 WL 1188874 (Tex. Dec. 16, 1999).
181. See id. at *2.
182. Id. at *1 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.034(a)); Rodriguez v. Naylor Indus., Inc.,
763 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1989)).
183. Id. (citing Nasser v. Sec. Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1987) (citations
omitted)).
184. See id.
185. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (holding an
employee who is fired for refusing to perform an illegal act-for which there is a criminal
penalty-can sue for wrongful discharge).
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ment-at-will doctrine may now encompass constructive discharges, as well
as actual firings, according to the decision in Nguyen v. Technical & Scien-
tific Application, Inc.186 This case involved a plaintiff who worked as a
network engineer for the defendant employer. The plaintiff was ordered
to load certain software onto personal computers and, believing this
would violate federal copyright laws, refused to do it. The employer in-
formed him that if he did not load the software, he would receive a pay
cut. Subsequently, the plaintiff was transferred to a position in the lab,
which he considered a demotion. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff re-
signed, stating that working for the employer had become intolerable af-
ter he refused to load the software.
The plaintiff brought suit for wrongful termination under the Sabine
Pilot exception, alleging he was constructively discharged. The employer
moved for summary judgment, asserting the exception did not apply to
constructive discharges, but only to actual firings. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the employer on this basis.
On appeal, the appellate court concluded that the intent of the Texas
Supreme Court in recognizing the Sabine Pilot exception to employment-
at-will was not to permit employers to avoid liability by forcing employ-
ees to resign, rather than firing them for refusing to break the law. 187 The
appellate court was careful to note that it was not creating a new cause of
action, but merely interpreting the precedent set by the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Sabine Pilot. Accordingly, the appellate court held
that the Sabine Pilot exception extended to employees who are construc-
tively discharged for the sole reason that they refuse to commit a
crime. 188
V. NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
The Southern District of Texas issued a notable decision in March of
1999 in the context of non-competition agreements in Maxxim Medical,
Inc. v. Michelson,189 although it has no precedential value, as it was re-
versed without opinion by the Fifth Circuit only three months later. The
case is remarkable for its ruling on a contractual choice of law provision
between the parties and for its application of the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure.
In Maxxim, the employer brought suit to enforce a non-compete clause
in a stock option provision, which contained a Texas choice of law provi-
sion. The former employee argued that California law, not Texas law,
should apply. The court applied the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws and held that, because the contract was one for personal services
and a majority of these services were rendered in California, California
186. 981 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
187. See id. at 902.
188. See id.
189. 51 F. Supp.2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999).
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law should apply. 190 In light of the reversal of this decision, Texas corpo-
rations may continue to assume (for the time being) that they can apply
Texas law through the inclusion of a contractual choice of law provision
in non-competition disputes, even with employees who perform the bulk
of their services in another state.
Applying California law, the court also addressed the doctrine of inevi-
table disclosure in connection with the employer's claim of misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. This doctrine relieves a plaintiff of the burden of
showing an actual misappropriation of a trade secret if it can establish
that the party's new employment with a competitor will inevitably lead
him to rely on his former employer's trade secrets. Although the court
applied California law to its tort analysis, it emphasized that the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine had been widely accepted in other states.191 Prior
to its reversal, Maxxim marked the first time a Texas court had expressly
recognized the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in a published opinion.
The Dallas Court of Appeals applied standard Texas contract law to a
nondisclosure agreement dispute in In re Marketing Investors Corp.,192
finding that a former company president breached an agreement by dis-
closing certain documents to his attorney. The employer sought enforce-
ment of a nondisclosure agreement signed by its former president to force
the return of certain documents so that the former president could not
use those documents in litigation. The court noted that nondisclosure
agreements are not subject to the same standards as covenants not to
compete, because they do not raise the same public policy concerns.1 93
Accordingly, the court found, pursuant to the usual law of contracts, that
the former president had breached the nondisclosure agreement by dis-
closing the documents at issue to his attorney.194
VI. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A plaintiff who argued that the arbitration agreement she signed dur-
ing the course of employment was tainted by procedural unconscionabil-
ity was required to go to arbitration, in an opinion issued by the
Beaumont Court of Appeals on a mandamus action in Pinkerton's, Inc. v.
Broussard.195 The plaintiff employee sued her employer for sex discrimi-
nation and retaliation, and the employer filed a motion to compel arbitra-
tion on the basis of an agreement the plaintiff had signed. Although the
trial court denied the employer's action, the appellate court held that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the agreement was tainted by procedural un-
conscionability. The plaintiff's allegations that she was "required" to sign
190. See id. at 784.
191. See id. at 786.
192. No. 05-98-00535-CV, 09-99-007-CV, 1998 WL 909895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
193. See id. at *2.
194. See id.




the agreement and that no one ever explained to her "what the arbitra-
tion process was all about" failed to show that the arbitration agreement
was made a condition of her employment. 96 The appellate court ob-
served that this finding was supported by the fact that the plaintiff had
later refused to sign an amended version of the arbitration agreement and
apparently suffered no adverse action as a result. 197
In McCormick v. El Paso Electric Co.,198 an arbitration case decided by
the El Paso Court of Appeals, an employee asserted claims for sexual
harassment under the TCHRA as well as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The district court stayed litigation and compelled the par-
ties to arbitration, pursuant to a general arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA"). The CBA provided that any grievance
between any employee and the employer would be resolved using a four-
step grievance procedure and arbitration, and that the employer would
not violate federal or state employment discrimination laws.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court,
holding that the causes of action pled by the plaintiff arose, not under the
CBA, but under the TCHRA and common law. 199 The appellate court
viewed the provision stating that the company would not violate federal
or state employment discrimination laws as merely creating a contractual
right that was "coextensive" with the employee's existing state and fed-
eral statutory rights.200 Therefore, the arbitrator's decision did nothing
more than resolve the contractual disputes arising under the CBA, with-
out resolving the plaintiff's sexual harassment or intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court order vacating an arbitration
award in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 351 v.
Cooper Natural Resources, Inc.,201 finding that the arbitrator imposed his
own sense of justice rather than interpreting and applying the collective
bargaining agreement at issue.202 The arbitration proceeding involved an
employee who was discharged after testing positive for drug use, then was
reinstated pursuant to a "last chance agreement," which required the em-
ployee to abstain from drug use and submit to further drug tests. The
employee demanded reinstatement without the last chance agreement,
and his grievance went to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the
employee, finding that the employee was not bound by the employer's
drug policy because it was not attached to the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and therefore he could have had no notice of it.
The Fifth Circuit, in affirming vacation of the arbitration award, noted
that there was no fact issue about the employee's notice of the drug pol-
196. Id. at *2.
197. See id.
198. 996 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1999, no pet. H.).
199. See id. at 244.
200. Id.
201. 163 F.3d 916 (5th Cir. 1999).
202. See id. at 920.
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icy, as the policy was distributed to all employees, the employee was
aware of it, and the union had not contested the notice issue during arbi-
tration.20 3 The court also held that because the last chance agreement
negotiated between the union and the employer was binding on the arbi-
trator, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an award based on
his own judgment about the employer's disciplinary measures. 20 4
VII. PREEMPTION
Following the rule established by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in
Holmans v. Transource Polymers, Inc.,205 the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals recently reiterated in Davila v. Flores20 6 that "[w]here common law
and a statute both provide remedies, the statutory remedy is cumulative
of the common law remedy unless the statute expressly or impliedly ne-
gates or denies the right to the common-law remedy. '20 7 Applying this
analysis to the plaintiff's claims in Davila, the court concluded that some
of the plaintiff's claims were preempted by the TCHRA, while others
were not.
The plaintiff, who was employed by the Texas Youth Commission, sued
his supervisors individually under the TCHRA, alleging retaliation, con-
structive discharge, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the use of the grievance process used to retaliate against the plaintiff,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and slander for
false accusations of abuse by the plaintiff toward one of the youth under
his supervision. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending
that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under
the TCHRA and that the TCHRA preempted the common law claims
arising out of the same retaliatory conduct.
The court of appeals agreed that the retaliation claim should have been
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 20 8 Moreover,
the appellate court determined that the claims for constructive discharge
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing essentially
amounted to retaliation claims, which must have been raised in compli-
ance with the TCHRA's provisions for administrative review.20 9 How-
ever, the court concluded that the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation and slander claims amounted to additional common
law causes of action that are not preempted by the TCHRA and did not
require administrative exhaustion.210
203. See id. at 919.
204. See id. at 920.
205. 914 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
206. No. 13-98-361-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 616 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Jan. 28,
1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
207. See id. at *5.
208. See id. at *4.
209. See id. at *6.
210. Id. at *6-7.
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VIII. 1999 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Although numerous employment-related bills were introduced in the
1999 legislative session, only a few of note were passed. Among these,
one of the most significant for employment law practitioners is House Bill
341, codified at Chapter 103 of the Texas Labor Code, which provides
employers with immunity from civil liability in connection with the provi-
sion of job-related information about a former or current employee to a
prospective employer of that employee. 211
The new law authorizes an employer to disclose information about a
current or former employee's job performance to a prospective em-
ployer.212 "Job performance" is defined as the "manner in which an em-
ployee performs a position of employment and includes an analysis of the
employee's attendance at work, attitudes, effort, knowledge, behaviors,
and skills."'2 13 The prospective employer need not seek authorization
from the employee to obtain this information.
The employer who provides such information cannot be held civilly lia-
ble for the disclosure, or for damages resulting from disclosure, unless it
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the employer knew at the
time the disclosure was made that the information was false, or that the
employer made the disclosure with malice or in reckless disregard for the
truth of the information. 214 The statute shields from liability a manage-
rial employee or any representative of the employee who is authorized to
and who does provide job performance information as provided in the
statute.21 5 Although the statute was apparently intended to encourage
more frank communications between employers regarding employee per-
formance, the statute makes it clear that employers are not required to
provide employment references.2 16
Although it is too soon to tell, it appears unlikely that this statute will
produce major changes in the way employers handle requests for job per-
formance information regarding their employees. Because the statute
protects only managers and those authorized to give out such informa-
tion, employers will likely want to continue to place limitations on who
may release references. Moreover, the statute essentially codifies the
prior state of the law, which allowed for liability where employers made
false statements with malice, even where a qualified privilege was appli-
cable.2 17 Because the statute arguably does not offer much additional
protection, many employers will probably continue to apply their previ-
ous policies and provide only "neutral" references on employees.
211. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.001-103.005 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
212. See id. § 103.003(a).
213. Id. § 103.002.
214. See id. § 103.004(a).
215. See id. § 103.004(b).
216. See id. § 103.005.
217. See Pioneer Concrete of Tex., Inc. v. Allen, 858 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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Another noteworthy change during the 1999 legislative session was the
amendment of Chapter 122 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, which provides protection to employees serving as jurors.2 18 The
legislative amendments put teeth into the existing law by increasing the
damages available to employees from six months of compensation to an
amount equal to one to five years' compensation. 219 The amendments
also created criminal penalties for violating the provisions of the Chap-
ter. 220 Violations are now considered a Class B misdemeanor, punishable
by a fine not to exceed $2,000, a jail term of not more than 180 days, or
both.221 A court may now punish by contempt any employer who termi-
nates, threatens to terminate, penalizes, or threatens to penalize an em-
ployee, because the employee performs jury duty.22 2
On a similar note, the legislature also expanded the protections availa-
ble under the state's nursing home whistleblower statue by amending the
Texas Health and Safety Code to add protection for contractors who pro-
vide services at nursing homes, as well as volunteers at nursing homes.
223
The amendment also requires that nursing homes post notice (in English
and Spanish) stating that persons reporting incidents of abuse or neglect
will not be subject to discrimination or retaliation by their employer.
Finally, the legislature codified requirements for contracts involving
staff leasing services companies by passing House Bill 1184.224 Under the
new law, all contracts between a license holder and a client company
must provide that the license holder shares with the client company: 1)
the right of direction and control over employees assigned to the client
worksite; 2) the right to hire, fire, discipline, and reassign employees; and
3) the right of direction and control over adoption of employment and
safety policies and management of workers' compensation claims. The
client company retains responsibility for: 1) direction and control of as-
signed employees as necessary to conduct the client company's business,
meet fiduciary duties, or comply with licensure, regulatory or statutory
requirements; 2) goods and services produced by client company; and 3)
acts, errors, and omissions of assigned employees committed within the
scope of the client company's business.22
5
218. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001-.002 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2000).
The prior version of the statute prohibited an employer from terminating an employee who
served as a juror and guaranteed the employee's right to return to the same job held by the
employee when first summoned to jury service. See id. § 122.001(a),(b) (Vernon 1997). An
employee could recover damages and attorney's fees in a civil action if injured in violation
of the statute. See id. § 122.002.
219. See id. § 122.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
220. See id. § 122.0021.
221. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.22 (Vernon 1994).
222. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 122.0022 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
223. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
224. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 91.032 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
225. See id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The cases and legislation surveyed in this Article should provide attor-
neys with a basic roadmap of significant developments in the employment
law area within the Survey period. The foregoing cases demonstrate that
employment law practitioners will continue to see the courts requiring a
more proactive approach from both employers and employees when deal-
ing with conflicts that arise in the workplace.
